

In the concluding section, the book brings out the limitations inherent in Rousseau's view of *amour-propre*. Mostly they come down to the overambitious aspiration, on the part of Rousseau, to "deliver a systematic account of the perils and promise of human existence" from the analysis of a single component of human nature, broadly construed and understood as at once part of the problem and of its solution. One is left wondering, however, whether the source of evil, in Rousseau's theodicy, really is in the end *psychological*, or does not reside in the *social arrangements*—divisive and competitive in the spontaneous order emerging from proto-socialization, harmonious and equitable after the "social contract" is enacted—that cause the same psychological disposition to generate two quite different outcomes.

In sum, the book creatively brings together the themes of *amour-propre* and recognition and sheds also a systematic philosophical light on the nature and import of our concern for our fellows' consideration.—Alessandro Ferrara, *The University of Rome–Tor Vergata*.

NUZZO, Angelica. *Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility. Studies in Continental Thought*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008. xii + 414 pp. Cloth, \$75.00; paper, \$27.95—Nuzzo's book examines Kant's theory of human embodiment and sensibility. She examines Kant not as an anthropologist or psychologist, but as a critical, "transcendental philosopher." Nuzzo wishes to defend Kant against charges of "mentalism" and "dualism." In the book, which presupposes a reader's familiarity with the three *Critiques*, the term "sensibility" (*Sinnlichkeit*) covers a complex territory that includes intuition, sensation, feeling, imagination, desires, affects, and emotions. Nuzzo argues that much of contemporary theory of the subject is built around a rejection, correction, and reformulation of Kantian notions of embodiment, which I find plausible. She argues that the notion of transcendental embodiment provides the unifying thread of Kant's epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics, and teleology of living nature. The book is intended as both a direct contribution to Kant scholarship and as an indirect way to think *with* Kant on embodiment; its primary aim is exegetical. The author sees her book as the first comprehensive study of transcendental embodiment in the three *Critiques*. Her study also discusses precritical reflections and texts such as *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766), "On the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Regions in Space" (1768), and *Dissertatio inauguralis* (1770).

The well-organized book contains an introduction, nine chapters, and a conclusion. It is divided into three parts: "The Body in Theory," "The Body in Practice," and "The Body Reflected." Each part is devoted to sensibility in relation to pure reason, practical reason, and the faculty of judgment. Nuzzo persuasively argues that Kantian sensibility, far from being a merely receptive faculty, discloses an independent, *active* component responsible for shaping human experience of and in the world. Pure reason owes the capacity of establishing itself in concrete human experience to its *embodied* sensible condition. Kant's transcendental doctrine ends Cartesian mind-body dualism by giving visibility for the first time to a pure, *a priori* dimension of our cognitive, practical, and aesthetic sensibility, a dimension that is irreducible to purely mental activities and is necessarily embodied. Kant grounds the humanity of *reason* in the distinctly human experiences made possible by the *a priori* of the human *body*.

Part 1 (containing chapters "Bodies in Space," "Bodies and Souls," and "Disembodied Ideas") investigates the role that sensibility plays in Kant's theory of knowledge and attempts to show how Kant's doctrine of space is the foundation of his epistemology and moral theory. Part 2 (containing "Bodies in Action," "Pure Practical Reason and the Reason of Human Desire," and "Freedom in the Body") argues that the practical form of the agent's body is something produced by the determination of the will through the moral law. This practical form is the first effect of, and does not precede, reason's intelligible causality. Part 3 (consisting of "Aesthetics of the Body," "Reflections of the Body, Reflections on the Body," and "Embodied Ideas") investigates the role played by the condition of embodiment with regard to the peculiar feeling of pleasure and displeasure that defines beauty and sublimity and that grounds our search for order in nature. Nuzzo argues that life is an *aesthetic* matter that concerns our faculty of judgment, and that only the activity of the reflective faculty of judgment can disclose a transcendental perspective on our experience of life.

The book's thesis about sensibility makes possible at least three future projects, for Nuzzo. By using the guiding thread of transcendental embodiment, one can question the relationship between Kant's critical philosophy and the applied philosophy found in the *Anthropology*, the *Metaphysics of Morals*, and *Opus Postumum*. One can also examine the rather peculiar situation that the (usually unacknowledged) influence of Kant is present precisely where contemporary analytic and continental philosophers claim to be *far* from transcendental idealism. Moreover, one can ask which model or methodology—transcendental philosophy or Hegelian/Marxian dialectic—allows us to come to the best understanding of the body. The book addresses Kant's transcendental consideration of the body rather than the dimensions

of history and culture. Since the book does seem to make these interesting projects possible, its achievements are all the more noteworthy.

The book admirably draws from both analytic and continental philosophy and demonstrates a deep understanding of Kant scholarship, contemporary debates, and the history of modern philosophy. It judiciously uses footnotes to elaborate points of agreement or disagreement with writers such as Derrida, Guyer, Heidegger, Lingis, Lyotard, Makkreel, Sallis, Shell, and Strawson. The book's analyses are insightful and perceptive, and I particularly enjoyed its closing discussion of the sublime in connection with freedom. Overall, Nuzzo's comprehensive book is aesthetically appealing and readable, having an overarching narrative that moves it along at a confident pace.—Robert R. Clewis, *Gwynedd-Mercy College*.

POUND, Marcus. *Theology, Psychoanalysis, and Trauma*. London: SCM Press, 2007. xix + 188 pp. Cloth, \$90.00; paper, \$28.75—Nothing says radical like the following: “I adopt a Protestant (Kierkegaard) and an atheist (Lacan) to defend the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and its institution.” This is the stated procedure of the final chapter of Marcus Pound's *Theology, Psychoanalysis, and Trauma*, and a central claim of the book's overall argument. It seems right that work coming out of the ‘tradition’ of Radical Orthodoxy would stretch the reader's tolerance for synthesis as far as possible, and wind up back at the same stubborn paradox of the Incarnation, a doctrine whose implications Pound extends pastorally to both the liturgical practice of the church and the counseling session of the psychoanalyst.

Roughly the first half of *Theology* lays the philosophical groundwork for the contrast of Kierkegaard and Lacan that will catalyze the theological work that culminates in the final two chapters. Pound's methodology is explained in different languages—sometimes “Lacanesque” as he calls it, and other times by means of Kierkegaardian concepts. He aims to perform “an analytic intervention on Lacan” or “to ‘repeat’ Lacan” through Kierkegaard. Given the technical jargon characteristic of Lacan and Kierkegaard, but also of Heidegger, structuralism, and deconstruction, there are several moments in the text where translations are in order, and sometimes Pound provides these. According to Pound, Kierkegaard's stages of existence and Lacan's “trinity” of the imaginary, symbolic, and real, can be viewed analogously, as can Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and subjective relations to truth and Lacan's

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Title: [Ideal Embodiment]



Source: Rev Metaphys 63 no3 Mr 2010 p. 715-17

ISSN: 0034-6632

Publisher: Philosophy Education Society, Inc
Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064

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